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1. Converging notions of procedural public order 
This paper aims at developing a comparative analysis of the rules gov-
erning refusal of recognition of foreign judgments, fundamentally based on 
national reports delivered within the research project “Remedies concerning 
Enforcement of Foreign Titles according to Brussels I Recast”1.
Albeit Member States provide for different procedural devices when 
it comes to recognition and enforcement of non-EU foreign judgments 
[automatic recognition e.g. in Italy2, exequatur system e.g. in Slove- 
1 Reports came from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden, The Netherlands, United Kingdom.
2 Pursuant to Art. 64 of law no. 218 of 31 May 1998; recognition is also automatic in 
Belgium, pursuant to Art. 22 of the code de droit international privé, in Greece, pursuant to 
Art. 323 of the local code of civil procedure, and in Estonia, pursuant to Art. 620 of the local 
code of civil procedure; the U.K. allows automatic recognition in actions in rem after the 
case Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd [1967] 1 AC 853; according to the Austrian 
report, the same holds for § 415 of the Exekutionsordnung and § 236 of the local Zivilproz-
essordnung; according to the pertinent reports, recognition is also deemed automatic in the 
Czech Republic and in France, albeit with some unclear limits in the latter (on the topic com-
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nia3, new trial e.g. in Sweden]4, and albeit only some of them require reci-
procity5, they all significantly converge with respect to the reasons that jus-
tify refusal to give effect. This convergence is determined mainly by the 
general clause of public order, and the growing consensus over the idea that 
such clause includes violation of fundamental procedural rules: hence, de-
spite several variations in the wording of the rules concerning specific pro-
cedural violations, such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of the rights of the 
defense, or fraud, it is quite unlikely that a judgment whose recognition is 
refused in a Member State for this kind of procedural considerations would 
nevertheless be recognized and enforced in a different Member State6. The 
same reasoning obviously applies to recognition of EU judgments, since 
grounds for refusal provided by Regulation 1215/2012 substantially corre-
spond, in these respects, to those provided by Member States’ national rules 
for recognition and enforcement of non-EU ones [albeit violation of public 
order must also be manifest when it comes to Regulation 1215/2012]7, but 
pare also, e.g., G. CUNIBERTI, C. NORMAND, F. CORNETTE, Droit international de l’exécution, in 
LGDJ, Paris 2010, esp. pp. 30-31, 40, 62).
3 Pursuant to Artt. 94-111 of the Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku; 
exequatur is also required in Lithuania, pursuant to Art. 809 of the local code of civil proce-
dure, and in Portugal, pursuant to Art. 978 of the Código de Processo Civil (Novo). 
4 Pursuant to Ch. 3, § 2 of the Kronofogdemyndigheten; new trial is also required in the 
Netherlands, pursuant to Art. 431(1) of the local code of civil procedure, and in the U.K. for 
actions in personam after the case Adams v. Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433.
5 Albeit no mention of reciprocity can be found in the reports from Italy, France, Bel-
gium, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, Estonia, and the U.K., this requirement appears in Art. 
101(3) of the Slovenian Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku, and in § 406 of 
Austrian Exekutionsordnung, and according to pertinent reports is also applied in Sweden 
and in the Czech Republic.
6 Correspondingly, comparatively restrictive interpretations of the notion of public or-
der may be also countered by wide interpretations of, e.g., the notion of lack of jurisdiction 
(see, e.g., for a refusal to recognize, on ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, a judgment 
disregarding foreign States’ immunity for acta iure imperii, after the holding by the Italian 
Constitutional Court no. 238 of 22 October 2014, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2015, p. 339, 
that denied the latter defense in cases of violation of human rights, the judgment of the 
Italian Court of Cassation no. 21946 of 28 October 2015, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2016, 
p. 859); on European procedural public order European Court of Justice leading cases were 
Case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935, Case C-38/98, Régie 
nationale des usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento [2000] ECR I-2973.
7 On this respect it is worth noting that public order precluding recognition of foreign 
judgments according to national rules is anyway often more limited in scope than public 
order governing implementation of national law (see, e.g., in Italy, the judgment of the Court 
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for the obvious general curtailment of challenges concerning jurisdiction 
and lis pendens.
2. Developments in notions of substantive public order
With respect to violations of substantive public order, mainly two rele-
vant fields of general interest can be identified: antisuit injunctions and pu-
nitive damages (instances of violation of a specific Member State’s substan-
tive public order will not be considered here, because exposition of such 
details is not necessary to the analysis of the procedural problems involved).
English antisuit injunctions were held incompatible with the system of 
reciprocal trust between Member States8, but after Brexit U.K. interested 
parties might try to plead that they should be recognized as non-EU for-
eign judgments. However, antisuit injunctions are not only a form of unfair 
jurisdictional competition within the system of reciprocal trust: they also 
infringe the fundamental principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz9, and, most 
importantly, the fundamental right of action of their addressee10; hence the 
public order clause contemplated in every Member State should preclude 
their recognition even as non-EU foreign judgments. Traditional European 
hostility to U.S. punitive damages awards, by contrast, seems to be fading: 
case law admitting their enforcement is emerging in several Member States, 
at least when they are not exceedingly disproportionate to the actual ones, 
especially because many European legal systems actually contemplate in-
stances of civil damages discretionally awarded by the court to a tort victim, 
regardless of the proof of prejudice, as a punishment for reckless wrongdo-
ing11.
of Cassation no. 17349 of 6 December 2002, in Archivio civile, 2003, p. 1081; compare, on 
the scope of public order in the field of recognition of EFTA decisions, the judgment of the 
Court of Cassation no. 4392 of 24 February 2014).
8 The European Court of Justice reaffirmed this principle beyond any reasonable doubt 
in Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc [2009] ECR I-663, para. 30.
9 See again Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc, supra, n. 8, para. 29.
10 See again Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc, supra, n. 8, para. 31.
11 Paralleling the rejection of proposals for a mandatory exclusion of punitive damages 
in Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L 199 (see 
Consideration 32 thereof), in Germany, the notorious halt to punitive damages in the judg-
ment of the Bundesgerichtshof, 4 June 1992, in ZZP, 1993, p. 79, has been tempered by a 
decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 24 January 2007, in JZ, 2007, p. 1046; in France 
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3. Conflicting decisions
The most complex difficulties in this field, hence, come from the problem 
of recognition of conflicting judgments: case law specifically on the topic is 
limited, but the issue is very often intensely litigated in the context of the is-
sues of lis pendens and parallel litigation, both with respect to cases pending in 
a different Member State and to cases pending outside the EU (albeit in such 
circumstances there is not yet an actual conflict, but only a prediction of risk 
of conflict: hence, lis pendens precludes also decisions that in the end might 
have turned out coherent, and not conflicting, if the case was not stayed).
A realistic evaluation of the dynamics of the resolution of conflicts of 
decisions, however, should warn from the start that rules governing preclu-
sive effects are actually applied with a much less analytical approach than 
what the supporting opinions would directly tell. In fact, especially when it 
comes to the determination of the scope of the preclusive effects of a judg-
ment with respect to issues explicitly or implicitly resolved, or with respect 
to third parties, governing principles are riddled with incoherencies that al-
low courts to exercise hidden discretionary powers, in order to take account 
of the possible errors of the judgment they should conform to: res iudicata 
is enforced according to several balancing factors, including symptoms of 
the reliability of the holdings whose implementation is asked, allowing the 
a general preclusion to recognition was denied by judgments of the Cour de Cassation, 1 
December 2010, in Bull., 2010, I, no. 248, and 7 November 2012, in Bull., 2012, I, no. 228; 
in Spain treble damages were already recognized by a decision of the Tribunal Supremo, 
13 November 2001, ECLI:ES:TS:2001:1803A; in Greece, a punitive damages award was 
already recognized in judgment 17/1999 of the plenary session of the Areios Pagos (see E. 
D’ALESSANDRO, Riconoscimento di punitive damages: in attesa delle Sezioni Unite, in Int’l 
Lis, 2016, p. 91); in Slovenia, a punitive damages award has been enforced by a decision of 
the Vrhovno sodišcˇe, 29 May 2013, in DR, 2014, p. 18; an opposite trend appeared, e.g., in 
Poland, after the judgment of the Trybunał Konstytucyjny of 23 June 2015, but the Euro-
pean Court of Justice seemingly put an end to it in Case C-367/15, Stowarzyszenie Oławska 
Telewizja Kablowa v. Stowarzyszenie Filmowców Polskich, 25 January 2017, EU:C:2017:36; 
in Italy, recognition was denied by the judgments of the Court of Cassation no. 1183 of 19 
January 2007, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2008, p. 395, and no. 1781 of 8 February 2012, in 
Giurisprudenza italiana, 2013, p. 126, but the issue has been deferred anew to the plenary 
session of the Court of Cassation for reconsideration by decision no. 9978 of 16 May 2016, 
in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2016, p. 1854, and the following decision by the plenary session 
no. 16610 of 5 July 2017 finally allowed recognition; compare the analysis developed in A. 
GIUSSANI, Resistenze al riconoscimento delle condanne al pagamento di punitive damages: an-
tichi dogmi e nuove realtà, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2008, p. 396-397.
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court to disregard effects that would determine a gross injustice; when this 
happens, however, reference to such factors remains implicit in the court’s 
supporting opinion, where the refusal to enforce the previous judgment is 
generally explicitly justified by way of an arbitrary selection of one of the 
principles governing operation of preclusive effects fit to reach the desired 
outcome12. Public interest in transparency of the administration of justice, 
indicates that courts should be more candid in their exercise of such inevi-
table discretionary powers, albeit such transparency may be more discom-
forting for civil law judges than for common law ones (since their legitimacy 
is more based on technical rather than political grounds, due to differences 
in the respective recruiting systems)13.
In the current state of opacity, however, consequent difficulties in de-
coding nuances of foreign judgments’ preclusive effects in the field of rec-
ognition are not the only factors putting at risk identity of effects of a EU 
decision within the whole European judicial space. In fact, several other 
factors, depending from the relative timing and force of conflicting deci-
sions, concur with them, according to the following analysis.
3.1. Conflict with local decision 
The first set of problems to consider concerns conflicts with local deci-
sions. ECJ case law provides a very wide notion of conflict when Regulation 
1215/2012 rules on lis pendens and related actions apply14, and Member 
12 This phenomenon is explored, in the Italian context, e.g. in A. GIUSSANI, Intorno alla 
“riflessione” del giudicato contro il terzo, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 2014, p. 1193-1198; 
ID., Appunti dalla lezione sul giudicato delle Sezioni Unite, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 
2015, p. 1564-1568; ID., Effetti conformativi della sentenza e sospensione del processo, in Ri-
vista di diritto processuale, 2017, p. 260-267; compare, for an overview in English of the set 
of general principles governing preclusive effects of judgments in Italian case law, ID., Effects 
of judgments – res iudicata, in M. DE CRISTOFARO, N. TROCKER (eds.), Civil Justice in Italy, 
Jigakusha, Tokio 2010, p. 123-160.
13 This aspect is analyzed in the classic work of M. DAMAŠKA, The Faces of Justice and 
State Authority, New Haven and London 1986, esp. p. 67-69.
14 Notorious European Court of Justice leading cases in the field are Case C-144/86, 
Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG v. Giulio Palumbo, [1987] ECR 4861, Case C-406/92, The 
owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship ‘Tatry’ v. the owners of the ship ‘Maciej 
Rataj’ [1994] ECR I-5439, Case C-351/96, Drouot assurances SA v. Consolidated metallurgi-
cal industries (CMI industrial sites), Protea assurance and Groupement d’intérêt économique 
(GIE) Réunion européenne, [1998] ECR I-3091.
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States tend to follow a similar approach with respect to national rules gov-
erning effects of non-EU foreign judgments15.
With respect to the latter, albeit lis pendens might preclude recognition 
only if the proceedings in the State of destination begun before the foreign 
ones, local res iudicata can be preclusive even if both the action and the 
judgment came after the foreign ones, albeit there might have been a viola-
tion of the lis pendens rule in the local proceedings: in fact, such violation 
cannot be pleaded any more after res iudicata16. This reflects also the idea, 
prevailing in the Member States, that a subsequent res iudicata prevails over 
a preceding one, because the effects of the latter one could have been raised 
in the proceedings that led to the former one, and therefore were (at least 
implicitly) conclusively denied: the second res iudicata might be illegal, but 
its violation of the law cannot be challenged any more (with the exception 
of some Member States, providing for a special extraordinary remedy for 
violation of res iudicata)17.
15 See, e.g., in Italy, the judgment of the Italian Court of Cassation no. 11185 of 15 May 
2007, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2008, p. 224.
16 For this solution see, e.g., in Italy, Art. 64(e) and (f) of law no. 218 of 31 May 1998; 
compare also, e.g., Art. 99 of Slovenian Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku, 
and Art. 25 of Belgian code de droit international privé.
17 Within Italian scholarly analysis, prevalence of the subsequent internal res iudicata 
is justified according to the general rule for resolution of conflicts favoring the last-in-time 
pursuant to art. 15 of the preliminary rules of the Italian civil code (see, e.g., the order of the 
Italian Constitutional Court no. 77 of 24 February 2006, in Giusto processo civile, 2006, p. 
143), e.g., in M.G. CIVININI, Il riconoscimento delle sentenze straniere, Milano 2001, esp. p. 
50, note 54; E. MERLIN, Il conflitto internazionale di giudicati. Profili sistematici, Milano 2004, 
esp. p. 50-55; E. D’ALESSANDRO, Il riconoscimento delle sentenze straniere, Torino 2007, esp. 
p. 311-313; this also means that subsequent internal res iudicata erroneously recognizing the 
foreign res iudicata whose recognition should have been precluded by former internal res iu-
dicata also prevails, see again E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 55-57; compare, for an implicit state-
ment in the same direction, the judgment of the European Court of Justice Case C-145/86, 
Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg [1988] ECR 645; see also infra, §§ 3.4 
ff.; in France, traditional preference for the last-in-time res iudicata has been superseded by 
decree no. 79-941 of 7 November 1979, providing for discretionary resolution of conflicts by 
the Cour de Cassation, pursuant to art. 618 of the French code of civil procedure, according 
to the transparency needs expressed above in the text, but this means that the remedy is not 
aimed at protecting the effects of previous res iudicata, and that later res iudicata is therefore 
generally prevailing, if any because a later judgment is generally more accurate (for a recent 
implementation of the rule in favor of the later decision see, e.g., the judgment of the plenary 
session of the Cour de Cassation no. 621 of 3 July 2015, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2015:AP00621); 
an extraordinary remedy for violation of res iudicata, and consequently, prevalence of the 
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With respect to EU decisions, whenever rules on lis pendens and related 
actions fail to prevent the conflict, a similar rule applies: recognition is pre-
cluded by a local conflicting decision, even if issued after the foreign one, 
and even if foreign proceedings started before the local ones; in such cases 
the purpose of granting a judgment the same effects within the whole Euro-
pean judicial space, according to the principle of extension of effects that is 
a pillar of the European system further implemented by the new wording of 
Art. 54 of Regulation 1215/2012, can be frustrated. However, since EU de-
cisions are recognized regardless of res iudicata, and even if they are merely 
provisional remedies, and preclusive effects are also granted, correspond-
first-in-time, by contrast, seems to be the rule, e.g., in Germany, pursuant to § 580, n. 7, 
of the Zivilprozessordnung, such remedy being extraordinary especially because according 
to some doctrinal analysis the priority rule should allow the interested party to plead the 
violation of previous res iudicata at any time (that is, even after expiry of the five-years dead-
line set by § 586 of the same Zivilprozessordnung), the main reference being the seminal 
work of H.-F. GAUL, Die Grundlagen des Wiederaufnahmerechts und die Ausdehnung der 
Wiederaufnahmegründe, Bielefeld 1956, esp. p. 94; in Italy general theory suggested that 
remedies should be deemed ordinary, that is automatically postponing effects of res iudicata, 
whenever their ground can be detected from the judgment, while grounds for extraordinary 
remedies (such as fraud) do not postpone such effects because they can be detected at any 
time, so that the deadline to file them runs from the moment of the detection, and only in an 
exceptional case a ground detectable from the judgment gives only an extraordinary remedy, 
that is the case introduced by law no. 353 of 26 November 1990 of art. 391-bis of the Italian 
Code of civil procedure, qualifying the special remedy against manifest error in the reading 
of the fact-finding in the proceedings at the Court of Cassation, introduced by a holding of 
the Italian Constitutional Court no. 17 of 30 January 1986, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 1986, 
I, 1, 1440, as an extraordinary one, see, e.g., on the reasons of this choice, C. CONSOLO, 
La revocazione delle decisioni della Cassazione e la formazione del giudicato, Padova 1989, 
esp. p. 185-235; it was argued that a special remedy against violations of European law, 
implementing holdings of the European Court of Justice such as Case C-119/05, Ministero 
dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA [ECR] I-6199, should also 
be extraordinary, see, e.g., C. CONSOLO, La sentenza Lucchini della Corte di Giustizia: quale 
possibile adattamento degli ordinamenti processuali interni e in specie del nostro?, in Rivista 
di diritto processuale, 2008, p. 225-238, esp. p. 237-238, but see also, contra, R. CAPONI, Corti 
europee e giudicati nazionali, in ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA FRA GLI STUDIOSI DEL PROCESSO CIVILE 
(ed.), Corti europee e giudicati nazionali, Bologna 2011, p. 239-390, esp. p. 363; revocation of 
a judgment for violation of res iudicata in Italy, however, is always an ordinary remedy, and 
is not available against judgments of the Court of Cassation, see the holding of its plenary 
session no. 10867 of 30 April 2008, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2008, p. 2776, and e.g. the 
subsequent judgments no. 29580 of 29 December 2011, and again from the plenary session 
no. 17557 of 18 July 2013 (a contrary view was endorsed in an obiter dictum of the judgment 
no. 18234 of 22 August 2006 in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2007, p. 1722).
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ingly, to decisions still subject to ordinary appeal, or even to merely provi-
sional remedies, this rule must be reconciled with the principles governing 
conflicts between decisions of different force.
3.2. Conflicts between local provisional remedy and EU judgment
On this regard, it is worth remembering from the start that whenever 
different Member States have concurring jurisdiction on a case, pendency 
of proceedings for provisional remedies in one of them does not prevent the 
action on the merits in the other one18. This necessarily implies that a sub-
sequent judgment on the merits conflicting with a prior provisional remedy 
in a different Member State is not even in violation of the lis pendens rule: 
hence, such judgment must prevail over the provisional remedy not only 
in the Member State that issued it (where a conflicting decision prevails 
even if it was issued in violation of the lis pendens rule or of the foreign res 
iudicata), but also in the Member State that issued the provisional remedy.
In fact, a different solution would introduce an incentive to another 
form of unfair competition between Member States’ jurisdictions: if a Mem-
ber State’s provisional remedy could be superseded only by a judgment on 
the merits in the same jurisdiction, a Member State could become a mag-
net jurisdiction simply by being very generous with provisional remedies; 
moreover, proceedings on the merits in the Member State that issued the 
18 This can be seen as a necessary implication of Art. 35 of Regulation 1215/2012, as 
well as of the holdings of the European Court of Justice Case C-321/95, Van Uden Mari-
time BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line v. Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and 
Another [1998] ECR I–7091, para. 29 (“the mere fact that proceedings have been, or may be, 
commenced on the substance of the case before a court of a Contracting State does not deprive 
a court of another Contracting State of its jurisdiction under Article 24 of the Convention”); 
compare also the recent holding of the European Court of Justice Case C-29/16, Hanse 
Yachts AG v. Port D’Hiver Yachting SARL and Others, 4 May 2017, para. 35 (“Having regard 
to that independence and the very clear distinction between the proceedings for the taking 
of evidence, on the one hand, and any substantive procedure, on the other, the concept of an 
‘equivalent document’ to a document instituting legal proceedings, set out in Article 30 of Reg-
ulation No 44/2001, must be interpreted as meaning that a document instituting proceedings 
for the taking of evidence cannot be regarded, for the purposes of assessing a situation of lis 
pendens and of determining which court is the court first seized within the meaning of Article 
27(1) of that regulation, as also being the document instituting the substantive proceedings”); 
Italian case law already reached this conclusion with the holding of the plenary session of the 
Court of Cassation no. 1821 of 13 February 1993.
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provisional remedy might be precluded altogether by lis pendens on the 
merits in a different Member State. Hence, the correspondence between 
conflicts relevant for lis pendens and related actions and conflicts relevant 
for recognition within Reg. 1215/2012 must be preserved: rules on refusal 
of recognition apply only to conflicts that could have been prevented; con-
flicts between decisions of different force are not prevented because they 
are resolved according to their difference of force, without undermining 
the production of the same effects within the whole European space by the 
(prevailing) judgment on the merits.
The inevitable conclusion is that local decisions prevent recognition of 
foreign ones only if they have the same force: a provisional remedy precludes 
recognition of a conflicting EU provisional remedy, regardless of the violation 
of the lis pendens rule by the former or by the latter, and regardless of the vi-
olation of the first-in-time decision by the second one, but not of a conflicting 
EU judgment on the merits19. Likewise, a local judgment on the merits pre-
cludes recognition of a conflicting EU judgment on the merits, but does not 
necessarily preclude recognition of EU, and non-EU, conflicting res iudicata.
3.3. Conflicts between local appealable judgment and foreign res iudicata
With respect to non-EU judgments, this is made quite clear in rules 
like the Italian ones, providing that local pendency is preclusive only if it 
19 Preclusion of recognition of conflicting provisional remedies was upheld by the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice Italian Leather SpA v. WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., C-80/00, 6 
June 2002; prevalence of foreign judgment of the merits, even if still subject to ordinary rem-
edies, was so obvious in Italian law (art. 669-novies, c. 4, of the Italian code of civil procedure 
expressly provides it), that even minor case law applies it straightforwardly since the last centu-
ry (see, e.g., the holding of the Tribunal of Rome of 25 March 1993, in Giustizia civile, I, 1996, 
p. 1479); according to the pertinent report, the same was held in the Netherlands by a decision 
of the Tribunal of The Hague 25 August 2011; for the same conclusion see also the judgment 
of the French Cour de Cassation of 14 May 1996, in Bull., I/201, 1996, p. 140; the holding to 
the contrary of the same Cour de Cassation of 20 June 2006, in Bull., I/315, 2006, p. 272, who 
did not even care to submit the issue to the European Court of Justice, is therefore a blatant 
violation of European law, seriously undermining France’s credibility as a trustworthy Member 
of the EU (see, e.g., for a deeper analysis of the latter decision, the critical considerations devel-
oped by E. D’ALESSANDRO, Il diniego di riconoscimento per contrasto tra provvedimenti nell’in-
terpretazione della Corte di cassazione francese: il caso dell’ordonnance de référé in conflitto con 
una sentenza di condanna straniera, in Int’l Lis, 2006, p. 134-139; compare, however, for the 
solution adopted in 1996, and with no mention of the 2006 odd precedent, H. GAUDEMET-TAL-
LON, Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe4, Paris 2010, esp. p. 441).
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precedes pendency abroad, and that local conflicting judgments preclude 
recognition only if they are res iudicata: a foreign res iudicata subsequent 
to a local judgment still subject to an ordinary remedy prevails over it, if 
the proceedings abroad started before the local ones20. However, the same 
should hold with respect to EU res iudicata, according to the rationales 
shown above: a Member State’s jurisdictions should not be allowed to com-
pete unfairly, and become a magnet jurisdiction just granting very quickly 
generous first-instance judgments still subject to appellate review; rules on 
refusal of recognition should govern only conflicts that could have been 
prevented by rules on lis pendens and related actions; res iudicata implies 
that the losing party lost every further opportunity to plead the effects of a 
previous conflicting decision in a different Member State.
Hence, a local conflicting decision, still subject to ordinary remedy, 
should not preclude recognition of a conflicting res iudicata from a differ-
ent Member State, nor hinder the purpose of granting a judgment the same 
effects within the whole European judicial space, even if rules on lis pen-
dens or related actions were also violated in the foreign proceedings: in fact, 
when it comes to Regulation 1215/2012 (as opposed to Member States’ 
national legislation on recognition of non-EU judgments), violation of rules 
governing lis pendens or related actions is no ground for refusal, and recog-
nition should not be precluded by a conflicting local decision still subject 
to ordinary appeal, because res iudicata has a greater force21. However, it 
20 According to Italian doctrinal analysis, effects of such recognition elapse when also 
the local conflicting judgment becomes res iudicata (compare, e.g., also for further referenc-
es, E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 53-55; E. D’ALESSANDRO, Il riconoscimento cit., esp. p. 311-
312); compare supra, § 3.1, n. 16.
21 Irrelevance of violation of lis pendens in the foreign proceedings for the purposes of 
recognition of an EU judgment derives directly from the wording of art. 45 of Regulation 
1215/2012 and its predecessors (see, e.g., the judgments of the Italian Court of Cassation 
no. 12181 of 15 September 2000, and no. 9554 of 12 November 1994 in Giurisprudenza 
italiana, 1995, I, 1, 2093; irrelevance of such violation in local proceedings is the necessary 
premise of the European Court of Justice case law cited supra, n. 14); according to some doc-
trine, enforceability should also grant a judgment a greater force, see, e.g., J. KROPHOLLER, 
Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht, Kommentar zu EuGVÜ und Lugano-Übereinkommen6, Hei-
delberg 1998, p. 364, but see, contra, for the sound reply that enforceability has no inherent 
relation with the degree of finality of a decision, e.g., E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 93-94; the 
judgment of the Italian Court of Cassation no. 9554 of 12 November 1994 granted enforce-
ment to a German res iudicata notwithstanding a contrary local appealable judgment on the 
merits (albeit with an unclear supporting opinion); prevalence of foreign res iudicata over a 
local appealable judgment was also granted by a decision of the Tribunal de Grand Instance 
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is important to stress that in such circumstances the interested party has 
the right, and therefore the burden, of pleading the foreign, automatically 
recognized, res iudicata in the appellate proceedings concerning the local 
decision: the proceedings concerning recognition should be stayed until 
exhaustion, or waiver, of all ordinary remedies against the local judgment22.
3.4. Conflicts between local res iudicata and foreign res iudicata 
A preclusion of recognition of a conflicting EU foreign res iudicata, 
therefore, operates only when the local judgment is also res iudicata: in such 
case the judicial determination is final and conclusive within the local juris-
diction, and conflicting foreign res iudicata cannot overcome it, regardless 
of the relative timing of the judgment or of the start of the litigation. How-
ever, even this holds only unless the later foreign res iudicata deals with the 
effects of a wider set of facts, including subsequent ones producing effects 
overcoming the effects previously ascertained: in fact, in such circumstanc-
es the second judgment is not actually conflicting, because res iudicata op-
erates always, as it were, rebus sic stantibus23.
de Paris 31 May 1989, in Revue critique de droit international privé, 1990, p. 550 (before the 
odd judgment of the Cour de Cassation cited supra, n. 19); it is worth repeating that relevant 
finality derives from exhaustion of waiver of all remedies whose deadline starts to run from 
the judgment (compare supra, n. 17), so that a French judgment subject to appeal to the 
Cour de Cassation, despite being a chose jugée, is not yet res iudicata within the meaning of 
the analysis developed here, and has a lesser force than an Italian judgment not subject to 
ordinary remedy, see again E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 95, 99-101.
22 The stay of proceedings may be justified by way of an analogical application of Art. 
51.1 of Regulation 1215/2012 (see the considerations developed by E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. 
p. 95-103); since such stay does not prejudice recognition, but rather helps it, allowing the 
local jurisdiction to implement the foreign judgment, and does not allow to resist recogni-
tion on grounds that should have been alleged in the Member State of origin, it would not 
defy the rationales that supported the ruling for a restrictive interpretation of the power of 
staying the proceedings in the Member State of destination held by the European Court of 
Justice Case C-183/90, B. J. van Dalfsen and others v. B. van Loon and T. Berendsen [1991] 
ECR I-04743.
23 Obviously new facts are relevant only insofar as they change the previous course of 
business between the parties (see, for an analysis of the meaning of the rebus sic stantibus 
clause, R. CAPONI, L’efficacia del giudicato civile nel tempo, Milano 1991, esp. p. 103-106); 
relevance of a wider set of fact may explain, e.g. the elusive judgment of the European Court 
of Justice Case C-145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg [1988] ECR 645 
(compare supra, n. 17), and the predicable frequency of such development in family matters 
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It is worth noting that this latter reasoning might lead to think that sub-
sequent foreign res iudicata might also prevail whenever in the foreign pro-
ceedings the effects of the local previous res iudicata were denied, explicitly 
or even implicitly: in fact, in such case the foreign subsequent res iudicata 
might be deemed covering a wider set of facts and effects exactly because it 
dealt also with the new fact consisting in the previous local res iudicata and 
its effects. The idea that the foreign judgment should never be recognized 
in such cases prevails in doctrinal analysis, but on quite weak grounds: with 
respect to non-EU judgments, it can be justified by a sovereign nationalistic 
choice24, but in the context of Regulation 1215/2012 general principles of 
mutual trust indicate that a later res iudicata, having a greater force than a 
preceding one, should prevail even over local res iudicata.
In fact, the relationship between rule and exception in the field of rec-
ognition is totally the other way round: a strict interpretation is required 
for the grounds of refusal25; hence, if extension of effects is the rule, the 
superseding effects of later res iudicata should be recognized as well, unless 
the procedural public order exception may apply, but no procedural public 
order can preclude recognition of such effects if violation of previous res 
iudicata is not subject to extraordinary remedy. Since such extraordinary 
remedy is contemplated only in some Member States, there seems to be no 
ground for refusal at least in Member States that do not have it.
Hence, the purpose of granting a judgment the same effects within the 
whole European judicial space should not be generally frustrated when lo-
cal res iudicata precedes the foreign one: since later res iudicata has a greater 
force, rules on refusal of recognition should generally not apply. Refusal to 
recognize in such cases, therefore, especially in Member States that do not 
grant extraordinary remedies for violation of res iudicata, looks rather like 
a breach of the mutual trust between Member States, in defense of local ju-
risdiction, unauthorized by Regulation 1215/2012, and certainly should not 
explains why the need to give prevalence of the later judgment was more easily acknowl-
edged in Art. 15.2(f) of Council Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters 
of parental responsibility for children of both spouses [2000] OJ L 160 (compare again E. 
MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 106-107).
24 A concurring rationale might consist in the aim of simplifying the court’s task (see 
again E. MERLIN, op. cit., esp. p. 42-45).
25 See, ex multis, the judgment of the European Court of Justice Case C-414/92, Solo 
Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Emilio Boch [1994] ECR I-2237, para. 20.
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operate for the resolution of conflicts between decisions both coming from 
different jurisdictions, which will be dealt with in the following paragraphs: 
it is only with respect to non-EU foreign judgments that a local res iudicata 
might determine a full preclusion.
3.5. Conflicts between foreign non-EU decisions
Whenever a conflict ensues between foreign decisions, both Regulation 
1215/2012 and some national rules26 governing effects of non-EU foreign 
judgments provide that in principle priority should govern its resolution. It 
is worth noting at the outset of this analysis, however, that identification of 
priority between different judgments must be carried out making reference 
to the last moment available for the parties to plead the effects of a foreign 
judgment: if res iudicata depends from the losing party’s neglect of an ordi-
nary remedy that allowed such pleading, the deadline to file such remedy is 
the relevant moment; otherwise, it coincides with the deadline for the last 
procedural step that allowed it27.
This consideration leads to underscore that with respect to conflicts 
between different non-EU foreign judgments, whose resolution is not gov-
erned by Regulation 1215/2012, the priority rules explicitly provided by 
some Member States may find a rationale in a least one of the following 
factors: i) in the Member State violation of res iudicata is a ground for an 
extraordinary remedy and is deemed contrary to public order; ii) in the 
Member State recognition of foreign judgments has constitutive effects; iii) 
in the Member State recognition does not follow the theory of extension of 
effects28. By contrast, whenever in the State of destination automatic rec-
ognition to foreign judgments of the same effects they have in the State of 
origin applies, and violation of res iudicata allows ordinary remedies only, 
systematic reasons dictate a preference for the later res iudicata that can-
26 See, e.g., Art. 99(1) of Slovenian Zakon o mednarodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku; 
Art. 25 of Belgian code de droit international privé; Art. 620 of Estonian code of civil proce-
dure, § 15 of the Czech Private International Law Act (according to the pertinent report, this 
might also be the French rule).
27 On these classic problems see again, for a thorough analysis and details over nuances 
and exceptions that need not be dealt with here, R. CAPONI, L’efficacia cit., esp. p. 113-172.
28 The third factor can be identified, e.g., in Art. 94(1) of Slovenian Zakon o medn-
arodnem zasebnem pravu in postopku, and, according to the pertinent report, in the Czech 
Republic (the issue is not dealt with in the Belgian, Estonian, and French reports).
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not be overcome by any parochial bias: in fact, in such case no purpose of 
defending the local jurisdiction can justify denial of its recognition, utterly 
regardless of the relative timing of the start of the respective proceedings.
3.6. Conflicts between foreign EU decisions
The analysis of the rules provided by Regulation 1215/2012 for reso-
lution of conflicts between different EU decisions seems to require from 
the start to underscore that the difference in wording with respect to the 
identification of conflicts should not be overestimated: albeit only conflict-
ing decisions specifically concerning the same cause of action and the same 
parties are considered, the scope of the rule tends anyway to coincide with 
the scope of the rules aimed at preventing conflicts, given the wide notion 
of lis pendens adopted by European case law. Hence, reversed claims, and 
third parties subject to the effects of the judgment, might well be involved 
in conflicts to be solved pursuant to Art. 45.1(d) of Regulation 1215/2012.
However, this rule refers to conflicting decisions: hence, just like Art. 
45.1(c), it applies only to decisions of the same force, for the several reasons 
already seen above. Since recognition of EU decisions is automatic under 
the theory of extension of effects, this means, e.g., that: i) a subsequent con-
flicting judgment on the merits prevails over a provisional remedy; ii) a later 
res iudicata prevails over a judgment on the merits, having a higher force 
(even when the proceedings leading to res iudicata started after the other 
ones, because the State of destination would have no interest in defending 
local lis pendens); iii) a later res iudicata prevails over a previous one, having 
a higher force, at least when the State of destination does not provide for 
an extraordinary remedy for violation of res iudicata, and the former res 
iudicata could have been pleaded in the State of origin.
3.7. Conflicts between foreign EU and non-EU decisions
Some further observations may be devoted to the conflict between a EU 
decision and a non-EU recognizable one, also governed by the priority rule 
pursuant to Art. 45.1(d) of Regulation 1215/2012. In this field it is obvious-
ly dispositive the choice of the State of destination between automatic or 
constitutive recognition of non-EU judgments: in fact, in the latter case only 
prior recognition of the non-EU judgment might preclude recognition of a 
conflicting subsequent EU decision of the same, or even of a lesser, force.
If, on the contrary, automatic recognition of non-EU decisions applies, 
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the same set of conclusions seen above would hold. However, Member 
States may provide for automatic recognition of non-EU decisions only 
when they are res iudicata29; in such States, the wording of Art. 45.1(d) of 
Regulation 1215/2012 might then imply that enforcement of a subsequent 
EU provisional remedy would not be prevented by a non-EU appealable 
conflicting judgment on the merits, notwithstanding the greater force of the 
latter. Moreover, preclusive effects of recognized non-EU judgments may 
be influenced by a Member State’s choice to assimilate them, instead of ex-
tending them: whenever a conflict ensues, its resolution may be accordingly 
different30.
3.8. Final remarks
The several variations shown here, however, do not seem to foster sig-
nificant unfair competition between Member States’ jurisdictions, and do 
not undermine operation of rules aimed at preventing conflicts between EU 
decisions: the purpose of granting an EU decision the same effects in the 
whole European judicial space may be sometimes frustrated by differences 
between the Member States in their degree of openness to non-EU legal sys-
tems but these differences remain within the realm of their own sovereignty. 
Hence, they may be deemed compatible with the reciprocal trust between 
Member States in the field of recognition of foreign judgments.
A more comprehensive fulfillment of the task of granting a decision 
identical effects within the whole European judicial space, in fact, probably 
requires a European federal judiciary to provide it.
29 For this solution see, e.g., in Italy Art. 64(d) of law no. 218 of 31 May 1998, in Greece 
Art. 323 of the local code of civil procedure, in the Czech Republic § 15 of the local Private 
International Law Act; the same rule might also apply in France, according to the analysis 
of the pertinent report.
30 Italy should apply the extension system also with respect to recognition of non-EU 
judgments, according to the analysis developed by E. D’ALESSANDRO, Il riconoscimento cit., 
esp. p. 64-76, but other Member States may follow a different path (compare supra, n. 28).
